Poetics Dianoesis.pdf

Dia-noesis: A Journal of Philosophy

2019 (7)

Imitation and learning Learning and pleasure Aristotle, Poetics 4

Vassilios Betsakos, Doctor of Philosophy, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

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hy do we take delight in the artistic representation of people, things and acts which -when encountered in reality- cause us sorrow and horror? Aristotle, Poetics I.4, 1448b4-19: Ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων: ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος.

VASSILIOS BETSAKOS 1.

IMITATION

1.1. Introductory The 4th chapter of Aristotle’s Poetics refers to μίμησις (imitation), which for Aristotle is the essence of poetry. In the first three chapters the differences among the forms of imitation regarding the media, the objects and the modes of imitation have been developed1. In the 4th chapter Aristotle talks about the origin of poetry; it is his firm position that the origins of a thing reveal its deeper content; the nature of beings, as a process of their production, development and completion, is prescribed and revealed through their origins2. Therefore, the discussion about the origin of poetry completes and unifies the three previous chapters, as, having been clarified in them how mimesis is differentiated in genres, the need to highlight itself, per se, as the essence of every poetic genre3 is derived. The adverb ὅλως in the topic sentence of the chapter (ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί) makes clear that the description of mimesis that will follow concerns all poetic genres. The use of the verb ἐοίκασι and its prioritization in the chapter highlight from the beginning the nature of the whole discussion: it is not going to be a historical description of

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Aristotle, Poetics, I.1, 1447a13-18: ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις ἔτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον· διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν, ἢ γὰρ τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον. See Iakov (2004), p. 65: “According to Aristotle, imitation (mimesis) is not the faithful, slavish copying and representation of reality, but the fictional construction (hence the word poiesis) of a project composed according to the rules of εἰκότος or ἀναγκαίου (Ch. 9)”. 2 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Z.8, 1033a 24-b19. 3 This methodological preference of his, that is to start his research from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us (γνωριμώτερα καὶ σαφέστερα ἡμῖν) and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature (γνωριμώτερα καὶ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει) is stated by Aristotle in the preamble of his Physics

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IMITATION AND LEARNING poetry’s origin; the verb ἔοικα states that there will be an investigation of the phenomenon using logical criteria4, timelessly, in order for a plausible and reasonable description to emerge, which will have a theoretical nature (without by any means being disproved by the already existing objective facts and empirical material that Aristotle has gathered). Thus the philosopher is not, and could not possibly be, interested in the historical representation of poetry’s origins. 1.2. Anthropological origin of poetry The origin of poetry is grounded on two causes, which are both emphatically said to be natural. This may be an explicit differentiation from the belief that traces the poetic phenomenon to the beyond-human factor of divine rage, which is of course a view supported by Plato5. For Aristotle the origin of poetry is anthropological. The emphasis given to the inherent nature of these causes creates a slight gap in the flow of the text: we would expect the philosopher to continue by naming explicitly each cause; instead the justification of the inborn nature of each cause is selected (a justification that, of course, functions indirectly as a juxtaposition of the two causes). The use of the conjunction γὰρ serves the double need for justification and clarification. Imitation is inherent firstly as it is revealed by the fact that it is a human trait from childhood (τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ). This is a

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Paul Feyerabend (1978) investigates and supports these forms of Aristotelian methodological choices, which he calls “Aristotelian common sense”. 5 An indicative formulation of this view is contained in Plato’s Ion, 534a7-b7: λέγουσι γὰρ δήπουθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς οἱ ποιηταὶ ὅτι ἀπὸ κρηνῶν μελιρρύτων ἐκ Μουσῶν κήπων τινῶν καὶ ναπῶν δρεπόμενοι τὰ μέλη ἡμῖν φέρουσιν ὥσπερ αἱ μέλιτται, καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω πετόμενοι· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγουσι. κοῦφον γὰρ χρῆμα ποιητής ἐστιν καὶ πτηνὸν καὶ ἱερόν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἂν ἔνθεός τε γένηται καὶ ἔκφρων καὶ ὁ νοῦς μηκέτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνῇ· ἕως δ’ ἂν τουτὶ ἔχῃ τὸ κτῆμα, ἀδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν καὶ χρησμῳδεῖν.

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VASSILIOS BETSAKOS phenomenological argument that verifies the theoretical nature of the whole study. The demonstrativeness of the phrase seems to have been completed, but the expression καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας is added. This addition will become fully understood only if its association with the inborn nature of imitation is shown. First of all, we are obliged to see in the verb διαφέρουσι the strong nature of a technical term; and it is not about any difference, but rather about a structural difference. Besides, the emphatic placement of the pronoun τούτῳ in front of the verb διαφέρουσι stresses the uniqueness of this particular difference: what differentiates man from other living beings is the fact that the human imitates and, simultaneously, through imitation he is learning, he is acquiring his first knowledge. In other words, we have to face the phrase as a whole; it is not imitation on its own that distinguishes the human species (the philosopher does not say that anywhere else), but the connection of imitation with knowledge6. How are all these connected, though, with the inherent nature of imitation? If the phrase ἐκ παίδων means that imitation ‘goes with’ the human, we can accept that ἐκ παίδων explains the prefix σύν in the word σύμφυτον; and that the phrase καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι…explains the second part of the word, the –φυτον, as well. Imitation is a natural human characteristic, as its differentiation for the human species reveals. The phrase ἐκ παίδων would not be adequate on its own to raise imitation to nature; it would be possible for the imitation to be just an incident from an external source and not an element of human’s nature. The second cause of the inborn capacity of mimesis is that the mimetic products give delight to everyone (καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας). The emphasis falls on πάντας which is placed last in the ancient Greek sentence and not in its ‘normal’ position, since the delight offered by imitation has a

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See also Aristotle, Problems 956a14: ὅτι μιμητικώτατον (mean. ὁ ἄνθρωπος)· μανθάνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο.

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IMITATION AND LEARNING universal character among people; it is an element of their nature. Certainly this second argument of imitation’s naturalness is not as firmly supported on self-implied assumptions, at least compared to the first one. Therefore, in order to reinforce it, Aristotle adds some evidence [σημεῖον]7 : even when people are in front of images or representations of sad things, they feel delight to the extent that these images or representations are well-made and realistic (μάλιστα ἠκριβωμέναι 8). Before we study the σημεῖον and its explanation in detail (this will be the main part of this article), let us see how the forenamed problem of the inherent nature of imitation9 comes to an end. Firstly, the word πάντας is indirectly justified with the use of the first person plural (ὁρῶμεν, χαίρομεν). Then, the delight that poetry offers is raised to human nature with the insertion of μανθάνειν. As the imitation itself has been connected with learning in order to be an undeniable human characteristic, the same applies to the delight that imitation offers, it is connected to learning in order to be attributed in turn to human nature. There is indirect reference during the explanation of the σημεῖον to the underlying assumption that man is the living being that is able to learn; αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς

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Aristotle, Prior Analytics, II.9 70a7-10: σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος· οὗ γὰρ ὄντος ἔστιν ἢ οὗ γενομένου πρότερον ἢ ὕστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι. 8 Detailed analysis of the phrase: Kyrkos (1972), p. 98, footnote. 1: “Mit Genauigkeit (ἀκρίβεια) und Exaktheit gearbeitet. Der Wortsinn bei Herodot (2, 78): μεμιμημένον ἐς τὰ μάλιστα bringt unsganz auf den Sinn dieser Stell τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας”. See also, Kurz (1973): 475-479. 9 On this subject the commentary of Ramfos (1992) is interesting, p. 113: “The fourth chapter introduces as a final cause a natural cause, playing the role of a poetic cause as well; which means that Aristotle understands the mimetic product (mimema) as a biological organization which is born, developed and matured and not as an artificial structure, constantly dependent on its physical creator”.

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VASSILIOS BETSAKOS

ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. The additive καὶ in the above sentence stresses that we have reached a second level of justification. Summarizing the data up to now, we can say that in the first part of the fourth chapter (1448b4-19) there is a bilateral justification of the inherent nature of imitation. On the one hand the production of poetry is indirectly justified: all humans imitate and are potential poets; on the other hand, the reception of poetry is justified: everyone is happy with imitation and is a potential audience of poetry. None of these two causes would be adequate on its own in order for poetry to be born and to exist. In line 19 the first part of the chapter is completed. It has become clear that poetry is imitation; however the reverse does not apply, as imitation does not become necessarily poetry, unless there are grounds for it. Thus, in the second part, primary reference is given to ῥυθμὸν and ἁρμονίαν and to the talented people who, through improvisation, ἐγέννησαν poetry10. We saw how the σημεῖον functions in the broader adhesion of the 4th chapter. Now we can move on to its detailed examination and to the interpretative problems that arise.

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Some scholars detect specifically in the following part of the text (1448b19-24) the second natural cause of the origin of poetry, considering that the whole reference to imitation and to the pleasure it causes is the first cause. This view, on the one hand, has the advantage of keeping closer to the meaning of the introductory phrase of the chapter (γεννῆσαι μεν ὅλως την ποιητικήν), namely that there is indeed reference to the creation of poetry and not to the naturalness of imitation. On the other hand, though, there are disadvantages which have to do with the structure of the text, as, with the above interpretation, the second cause is considerably moving away from the first one and it is not sufficiently connected to it either grammatically-syntactically or conceptually. Kyrkos (1972), p. 66: “Im 4. Kapitel der Poetik versucht Aristoteles, die Poesie auf den natürlichen Mimesistrieb zurückzufürhen und zugleich den Ursprung der Kunst zu bestimmen. Es fürht sie auf zwei notwendig miteinander verbundene Ursachen zurück: Erstens auf den von der Natur angebotenen Mimesistrieb des Menschen und die daran anknüpfende Freude am μιμεῖσθαι, und zweitens auf den ebenso natürlichen Harmonie-und Rhythmustrieb des Menschen”. Also, Else (1957), p.127.

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IMITATION AND LEARNING

1.3 The σημεῖον (1448b9-12) and its explanation (b12-17)

ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. While the sight of certain things is accompanied by sorrow, the vision of their images (the most life-like/realistic, the better) causes delight, as, for example, the representations of the most repulsive beasts and of the deceased. The phrase λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν is used for people’s attitude towards reality; the phrase χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες for their attitude towards images. The different perspective11 of the two cases is obvious: while we approach reality with sight, we perceive the images with contemplation, which is, of course, a wider concept, as it includes both the sense (sight) and its logical processing. The verb ὁρῶμεν places the human within reality, whereas θεωροῦμεν 12 across its representation. Τhere is yet another difference between the two sentences; in the phrase ὁρῶμεν λυπηρῶς the fact and the act of the sense (of sight) is expressed with a verb and is accompanied with the modal adverb of the emotion (sorrow); in the phrase χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, the fact and the act of the sense (contemplation) is expressed with a participle, whilst with the verb the emotion (delight) is expressed. The above differentiation allows the necessary emphasis to be given to the desideratum, τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Definitely, though, with the participial phrase the more active attitude of the subject of observation becomes obvious as well; if, in other words, the induction of the emotion of sorrow towards reality is almost automatic, it can also be accepted that the 11

On the different ways in which the spectator watches a tragedy, there is an interesting view by Belfiore (1985) where the following is stated a well: “we can view tragedy: 1.qua artifact that does not represent anything (qua clothes and not costumes), 2. qua peοple weeping, doing certain actions, etc., 3. qua likeness, as actors representing people weeping, etc.”. Also, Halliwell (1992), p. 244. 12 On the instructive role of poetry see Croally (1994), especially the chapter “Τhe didactic production” of the first part of the study.

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VASSILIOS BETSAKOS induction of the feeling of delight towards the images is mediated by the active participation of the subject13. The infinitive μανθάνειν comes to reveal the form of this action. We would expect perhaps, if the discourse were less dense, for it to be said definitively that what is mediated is learning; this does not happen, due to the fact that the verb θεωρῶ on its own includes the cognitive function. As the text progresses, the connection between learning and pleasure is justified in turn (this is the meaning of the additive καί); αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. Since with the ἐπὶ βραχὺ14 a distinction between the philosophers and the rest of the people is added, we should probably accept that the adverb ὁμοίως here introduces comparison and not identification; if

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We are led to this interpretation by the following: Aristotle’s Protrepticus, 88, 1-8: Ἔτι τοίνυν ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ ἡδόμενον πίνειν καὶ τὸ ἡδέως πίνειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει μὴ διψῶντά τινα μηδ’ οἵῳ χαίρει πόματι προσφερόμενον πίνοντα χαίρειν, μὴ τῷ πίνειν ἀλλὰ τῷ συμβαίνειν ἅμα θεωρεῖν ἢ θεωρεῖσθαι καθήμενον. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἥδεσθαι μὲν καὶ ἡδόμενον πίνειν φήσομεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ πίνειν οὐδ’ ἡδέως πίνειν. οὐκοῦν οὕτως καὶ βάδισιν καὶ καθέδραν καὶ μάθησιν καὶ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ἐροῦμεν ἡδεῖαν ἢ λυπηράν, οὐχ ὅσων συμβαίνει λυπεῖσθαι παρουσῶν ἡμᾶς ἢ χαίρειν, ἀλλ’ ὧν τῇ παρουσίᾳ καὶ λυπούμεθα πάντες καὶ χαίρομεν. 14 For the phrase ἐπὶ βραχὺ several interpretations have been proposed; it can be understood either as a quantitative or a qualitative or even as a time qualifier. The same phrase is twice met in the Aristotelian corpus: History of Animals, II.11 503a25-29: Ἐπὶ βραχὺ δὲ καὶ τούτων τῶν μερῶν ἕκαστον διῄρηται εἴς τινας δακτύλους, τῶν μὲν ἔμπροσθεν ποδῶν τὰ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν τρίχα, τὰ δ’ ἐκτὸς δίχα, τῶν δ’ ὀπισθίων τὰ μὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν δίχα, τὰ δ’ ἐκτὸς τρίχα. Also: Movement of Animals, 711b22-27: τῶν δ’ ὄπισθεν σκελῶν εἰ μὲν ἦν εἰς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν ἡ κάμψις, τῶν ποδῶν ὁ μετεωρισμὸς ὁμοίως ἂν αὐτοῖς εἶχε τοῖς προσθίοις ἐπὶ βραχὺ γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο καὶ τούτοις κατὰ τὴν ἄρσιν τῶν σκελῶν, τοῦ τε μηροῦ καὶ τῆς καμπῆς ἀμφοτέρων ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς γαστρὸς τόπον ὑποπιπτόντων. It is obvious that in both these extracts the phrase has a time content; if the same applies to the Poetics, the phrase means that simple men differ from philosophers in the fact that they do not always and constantly turn to learning, although, whenever this happens, it causes pleasure to them.

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IMITATION AND LEARNING for the philosophers μανθάνειν is ἥδιστον15, for the rest of the people the pleasure would be at least ηδύ. The directly following sentence (διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος) is connected with γάρ; it does not form, however, a subsequent level of justification, as it just repeats illustratively the already given connection between learning and pleasure; it is an effort to clarify the meaning of μανθάνειν. This clarification has caused many interpretative problems and many opinions concerning its meaning have been proposed. In the next chapter these very problems will be presented as well as these aspects: What does μανθάνειν mean, what type of learning is it about? What does συλλογίζεσθαι mean, is it used as a technical term? What is the relation between μανθάνειν and συλλογίζεσθαι? How intensely does the typical question τί ἕκαστον (ἐστίν) maintain its technical philosophical nature? Lastly, how does the phrase οὗτος ἐκεῖνος function by example, to what do οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος correspond and how are they related?

2.

LEARNING

In Plato’s Euthydemus, there is a broad reference to the meaning of the verb μανθάνω; according to it, the verb μανθάνω can in cases be used ἐπειδὰν ἔχων ἤδη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ταυτὸν τοῦτο πρᾶγμα ἐπισκοπῇ ἢ πραττόμενον ἢ λεγόμενον. μᾶλλον μὲν αὐτὸ ξυνιέναι καλοῦ-

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See also Aristotle, Parts of Animals, I.5 645a7-15: καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις ἀμηχάνους ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις. καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. Interesting comments on the above section relating to the Poetics in Sifakis (1986), p. 214-215.

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VASSILIOS BETSAKOS

σιν ἢ μανθάνειν, ἔστιν δ᾿ ὅτε καὶ μανθάνειν.16 The verb μανθάνω, in other words, reveals that the cognitive process is inductive, that a single case is recognised as what it is and it is integrated into its established-in-advance category. This function of induction and recognition that is stated with the verb μανθάνω is presented clearly in two extracts from the (pseudo)-Aristotelian Problems: ῥᾷον δὲ διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων καὶ τῶν λόγων μανθάνουσιν· ἃ γὰρ ἴσασιν ἔστι ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, τὰ δὲ ἐνθυμήματα ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἃ ἧττον ἴσμεν ἢ τὰ μέρη17. Based on the polarity καθ’ ἕκαστον/καθόλου a learning process established on pre- existing knowledge is described. In the second extract there is explicit use of the verb ἀναγνωρίζω, which in fact coincides with χρῆσθαι τήν ἐπιστήμην: διὰ τί ἥδιον ἀκούουσιν ᾁδόντων ὅσα ἂν προεπιστάμενοι τυγχάνουσιν τῶν μελῶν, ἢ ὧν μὴ ἐπίστανται; πότερον ὅτι μᾶλλον δῆλος ὁ τυγχάνων ὥσπερ σκοποῦ, ὅταν γνωρίζωσι τὸ ᾁδόμενον; τοῦτο δὲ ἡδὺ θεωρεῖν, ἢ ὅτι {τὸ θεωρεῖν μᾶλλον} ἡδὺ {ἢ} τὸ μανθάνειν; τοῦτο δ᾿ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ μὲν λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.18 For Aristotle, the cognitive approach of καθ’ ἕκαστον is not possible, except for using some given knowledge as a tool. Summarizing, then, we are saying that the use of the verb μανθάνω requires recognition of the general on the partial as well as pre-existing knowledge. However, before seeing and evaluating more broadly, based on the above opinion, the meaning of learning19 as a bridge between imitation and pleasure, we should also investigate the use of the verb συλλογίζομαι.

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Plato, Euthydemus, 278a1-5. Aristotle, Problems, 916b30-34. 18 Aristotle, Problems, 918a3-8. 19 Aristotle examines, at least in the 4th chapter, the phenomenon of poetry as a cognitive-theoretical problem and not as an aesthetic problem. See Kyrkos (1972), p.101: “Im Rahmen der Wissensfrage, ... ist bei Plato wie auch bei Aristoteles eine Diskussion über die Dichtung und generell die Kunst möglich, und nicht im Zusammenhang einer Ästhetik”. 17

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IMITATION AND LEARNING Many opinions have been expressed about which sense this verb is used with; some scholars believe that in this verb we should see the whole carriage of the technical term συλλογισμός, while others that it is just a judgement verb20. Possibly, the verb συλλογίζομαι extends the specialized meaning of the verb μανθάνω. In this way its use as a technical term also becomes tenable, with the meaning being clarified in the Aristotelian definition of συλλογισμός: συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐνᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν ὅρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον21. The initiation of συλλογισμός from some data, some pre-existing knowledge, is obvious; what does συλλογίζεσθαι add to μανθάνειν though? According to the above definition, in order to have a συλλογισμός, an assertion (ταῦτα εἶναι) should precede. However, as we saw, this exact function of equation is put through the verb μανθάνω. Μανθάνειν raises the part to the whole, whilst συλλογίζεσθαι, in the form of a conclusion, adds to this part the characteristics of the whole in which it has been integrated. Based on the above, we can move on to the interpretation of the phrase τί ἕκαστον22. Syntactically, τί ἕκαστον can be an object either to συλλογίζεσθαι or to the whole μανθάνειν

20

For example, Montmollin ( 1951), p. 204, fn. 35, believes that the verb means “infer by syllogistic reasoning”. Also, Sifakis (1986), p. 215: “I suggest, therefore, that syllogizesthai does not simply mean «consider» or «reflect» but «draw a logical conclusion from certain premises”. The opposite view is supported in the statements of Lucas (1968), p. 72 and Else (1957), p. 130. On the meaning of συλλογίζεσθαι see also: Lear (1988), p. 307, fn. 43. 21 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I.1 24b19-23. 22 Sifakis (1986, p. 217) makes an insightful analysis in order to specify the meaning of the two pronouns: “Aristotle uses the noun μίμημα in the sense "the imitating (art)", the transitive participle μεμιμημένον (at Rhet. 1371b6) to mean two different things: the image or likeness of the thing imitated or depicted by the work of art and the imitating thing itself, the model of representation, which has an independent existence in reality”.

17

VASSILIOS BETSAKOS

καί συλλογίζεσθαι. In both cases, ἕκαστον expresses whatever is in front of, or whatever is contemplated by the observer of the representational products (τὰς εἰκόνας); the pronoun τί, on the contrary, as a predicate to ἕκαστον, would express all the characteristics that can be given to ἕκαστον. Some scholars, considering τί ἕκαστον as an exclusive syntactic supplement of συλλογίζεσθαι, and given the technical meaning of the typical question τί (ἐστι) ἕκαστον, assume that τί points to the gender of the subject. In this way, they connect the essential cognitive process described in the 4th chapter, with everything said in the 9th chapter on the ability of the poetic art to approach the whole (καθόλου) (as opposed to the science of history, which is attached to the καθ’ ἕκαστον)23. This linking, though, of the pronoun τί with καθόλου barely coincides with the example that follows in the text (οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος). For this reason some of the above scholars are obliged to give to the demonstrative pronoun οὗτος the meaning of τοιοῦτος, which at this point seems to infringe the text’s data. In the event that we accept, though, that the phrase τί ἕκαστον is a common object to the whole μανθάνειν καί συλλογίζεσθαι, we interpret it broadly in relation to the use of the pronoun τί; the predicate τί could in this way function as a pronoun for both nouns and adjectives; for nouns due to the identifying and matching function of μανθάνειν; for adjectives (ergo for καθόλου) due to the logical function of συλλογίζεσθαι. The above interpretation of τί ἕκαστον includes on the one hand the technical understanding of the typical question τί ἐστιν (and consequently refers to the function of poetry in relation to καθόλου), and on the other, it simplifies the understanding of οὗτος ἐκεῖνος as an example of the identifying function of μανθάνω, indicative for only one 23

Aristotle, Poetics, I.7 1451b5-11: διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ’ ἱστορία τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστον λέγει. ἔστιν δὲ καθόλου μέν, τῷ ποίῳ τὰ ποῖα ἄττα συμβαίνει λέγειν ἢ πράττειν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη· τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἕκαστον, τί Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν.

18

IMITATION AND LEARNING function (out of many others) of μανθάνειν καί συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον. Understanding, therefore, οὗτος ἐκεῖνος in its limited indicative exemplary function, we can accept that Aristotle reserves to the poetic imitation not only the ability of representation, but also a broad instructional function. In this way, the problem of many scholars who consider the process of recognition as inconsiderable learning is overcome as well24. The fact that the phrase οὗτος ἐκεῖνος follows the syntactic form of τί ἕκαστον (οὗτος corresponds to ἕκαστον whilst ἐκεῖνος to τί) does not mean that it functions as an example for the whole range of categoric correspondences between ἕκαστον and τί. However, in order to be able to have a more complete opinion about the example οὗτος ἐκεῖνος, we should take into consideration the passage from the Rhetoric as well: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι, οἷον τό τε μιμούμενον, ὥσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητική, καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν ᾖ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει25. In this passage there is an elaboration (similar to the instruction of the Poetics) on the ability of poetry to reverse the feelings of reality. Here, we will stress only the following: the above passage is the ending of a proof that μανθάνειν (in the broad sense of the word) is ἡδὺ, and functions with this exact prerequisite. Hence, we should not consider that συλλογισμός in this passage runs out in τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο; on the contrary, this is the assertion (τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι) from which συλλογισμός is induced,26 the essential context of which is introduced with the deductive ὥστε.

24

E.g., Lucas (1968), p. 72: “when we have learnt what already familiar thing a picture represents we have not learnt much”. On the contrary, the escalation of the poetic learning is accepted by Kannicht (1986), p. 74. 25 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.11 1371b4-10. 26 Aristotle, Metaphysics, M.4 1078b24: ἀρχὴ τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὸ τί ἐστίν.

19

VASSILIOS BETSAKOS From the concluding sentence of the first part of chapter 4, we would comment only on the phrase ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς. The verb προορῷ obviously refers to the given knowledge that μανθάνειν καί συλλογίζεσθαι require. The necessity of this pre-existing knowledge is so obvious that it is not even stated clearly on its own, but with the slightly blunt ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς it is directly discussed what happens when such knowledge is absent. As we saw, in the first part of the 4th chapter Aristotle insists on supporting the anthropological origins of poetry using as a main argument the attribution of imitation to human nature. The key to this attribution is the mediation of learning; imitation itself offers humans their first knowledge, while the pleasure caused by imitation is the pleasure of a cognitive process. What knowledge does this process offer, though? What does the θεωρῶν τὰς εἰκόνας, learn? It is known that the ancient spectator of tragedy has a grasp of the mythological substances; he is aware of characters and deeds, of the gods and the heroes, of the cities and the locations, of the primogenitors and the family members that play a leading role in the great mythological circles and, lastly, he knows the important facts determining the characters’ fate, but he is also informed about a large number of, often mutually contradictory, non-essential details. Thus, as a spectator of a particular tragedy which redevelops the entire or part of this material, he retrieves in his memory this given knowledge and information, he recognizes on stage primarily the people he has certainly heard about several times since childhood (or seen in other tragedies and performances) acting in this particular mythical narrative. Certainly, this recognition is almost automatic and it does not constitute learning on its own. However the θεωρῶν does not linger on μανθάνειν; in front of him he no longer has a static, easily recognizable material, but he has πράττοντας, acting people; in front of him a process is being unfolded, the myth and the systasis of the events as they have been structured by the particular poet. Each of the characters and

20

IMITATION AND LEARNING deeds, the facts and the misfortunes, falls into place during the flow of the myth. The θεωρῶν now speculates on τί ἕκαστον, which is the role of each element within the probable development of the story. We saw in the definition of συλλογισμός that τί means διὰ τί. This is exactly what is realized by the particular myth of the particular poet, that is the causative connection of the events. The identifying function, therefore, is not exhausted in the identification of what is happening on stage with the pre-given information; the spectator recognizes also in what is happening on stage the universal causative associations that govern his own everyday life (of course insofar as it is about τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας). In this regard, he resembles at times (as, by recognizing καθόλου, he experiences admiration and ἔκπληξιν) the philosophers who are permanent owners of this universality. Poetry makes its spectator a participant to καθόλου, by isolating and revealing, in the various and contradictory καθ' ἕκαστα of the story and of the mythological material, the thread that connects them, recasting them into a wellmade myth according to εἰκὸς καὶ ἀναγκαῖον. It would be completely unnatural to confine the meaning of τί ἕκαστον, namely what the spectator is learning, in the recognition of the genus of some concepts. The spectator stands in front of a reality which he wants to be clearer than the incoherent everyday life. We are not in position to pettily limit his surprise in the discovery of this transparency only to the technical philosophical division of the genus species27. What is still remarkable, though, in the 4th chapter, is the almost total absence of particular opinions regarding what the spectator of the tragedy is learning concerning the very object of the knowledge he is acquiring. The explanations 27

Aristotle always functions at first empirically, records what he sees and his record is complex only to the extend of complexity that the clarity of his sight causes; he views the simple in its simplicity. We cannot accept that his views on the poetic phenomenon should be sophisticated. We should understand whatever he says in their greatest as well as insightful simplicity. Thus, any complex interpretations by most of the Poetics’ scholars seem unsubstantiated.

21

VASSILIOS BETSAKOS that I can give are the following: first of all, in the following chapters some hints are not to be missed, especially in the chapter where poetry is compared to history; secondly, the transparent experience of the tragedy itself by Aristotle and his contemporaries, make the hints of μανθάνειν καί συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, which to us are incomplete, so adequate, that obvious clarifications are superfluous; thirdly, what is of importance for the philosopher here may not be so much what the spectator is learning but the very fact of learning.

3.

LEARNING AND PLEASURE

As we saw, the second cause of poetry’s origin is the delight that the mimetic products offer to all people. What is the nature of this delight (the Aristotelian term is ἡδονή) that poetry offers? Certainly it is not an aesthetic pleasure28 in the sense that we attribute today to the enjoyment of the works of art, as something different from experiencing reality; the spectator of the tragedy experiences feelings of the same nature as the feelings he experiences facing reality as well29. As it is clearly said in the Poetics: διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν, the pleasure that the mimetic product offers is the pleasure that learning offers to humans. The starting point of this cognitive pleasure is probably the joy of the senses, especially of vision: σημεῖον δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀγάπησις: καὶ γὰρ

28

See Kyrkos (1972), p. 100: “Aber die davon abgeleitete Freude ist hier nun secundaer alss aesthetischer Genues zu verstehehen, vielmehr als die unverkennbare Freude am Wissen bzw. Wiederkennen". Also Belfiore (1985) p. 349: The pity and fear we experience while watching Oedipus the King are painful, just as they are in real life, and not different, pleasurable, aesthetic emotions”. 29 Aristotle, Politics, VIII.5 1340a23-28: ὁ δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον (οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ δι᾿ ἄλλην αἰτίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον τούτῳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, ἡδεῖαν εἶναι).

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χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι' αὑτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἱρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων30. Consequently, since it originates from the senses, the delight of knowledge is traced to human nature itself. The fact that the aforementioned position is common ground does not prevent Aristotle from investigating more deeply the nature of ἡδονή offered by knowledge. He considers that pleasure accompanies τὸ θαυμαστόν, as is shown in the following distinctive advice of the Rhetoric: διὸ δεῖ ποιεῖν ξένην τὴν διάλεκτον· θαυμασταὶ γὰρ τῶν ἀπόντων εἰσίν· ἡδὺ δὲ τὸ θαυμαστόν ἐστιν31. Certainly, the delight that admiration causes is an extension of the sensory starting point: ἔνια δὲ τέρπει καινὰ ὄντα, ὕστερον δὲ οὐχ ὁμοίως διὰ ταὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον παρακέκληται ἡ διάνοια καὶ διατεταμένως περὶ αὐτὰ ἐνεργεῖ, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν οἱ ἐμβλέποντες, μετέπειτα δ᾽ οὐ τοιαύτη ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀλλὰ παρημελημένη· διὸ καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀμαυροῦται32. The wondering admiration becomes the first step for theory33 and for knowledge: διά γάρ τό θαυμάζειν οι άνθρωποι…ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες34. 30

Aristotle, Metaphysics, I.1 980a21-27. Aristotle, Rhetoric, III.10 1410b10-12. 32 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.4 1175a6-10. 33 Mette (1961) has shown the etymological relation among the roots θεα- (θεῶμαι), θεωρ- (θεωρῶ), θαυμ- (θαυμάζω). 34 Noteworthy commentary on the excerpt by M. Heidegger: “Es wäre sehr oberflächlich und vor allem ungriechisch gedacht, wollten wir meinen, Platon und Aristoteles stellten hier nur fest, das Erstaunen sei die Ursache des Philosophierens. Wären sie dieser Meinung, dann hieße das: irgendeinmal erstaunten die Menschen, nämlich über das Seiende, darüber, daß es ist und was es ist. Von diesem Erstaunen angetrieben, begannen sie zu philosophieren. Sobald die Philosophie in Gang gekommen war, wurde das Erstaunen als Anstoß überflüssig, so daß es verschwand. Es konnte verschwinden, da es nur ein Antrieb war. Aber: 31

23

VASSILIOS BETSAKOS The link between admiration and cognitive pleasure is ἐπιθυμία: καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, as well as: ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις ἡδονή35 . It is a conscious, rational ἐπιθυμία. Therefore, the cognitive pleasure is attributed, at least at the beginning, to admiration. At this point it is not so much the pleasure from owning the knowledge nor from the future use of this knowledge, but the pleasure offered by the transition from conscious ignorance to knowledge itself: ὁ δ' ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν... διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν... διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν36. Wise is the man who can be raised from the part to the whole, because he is aware not merely of the ὅτι but also the διότι. Transitioning from ignorance to knowledge means discovering the causes. Thus, a course has been created which starts from the joy of the senses and by means of delight and admiration reaches the pleasure of learning. This in turn functions as the final

das Erstaunen ist ἀρχή es durchherrscht jeden Schritt der Philosophie. Das Erstaunen ist p;auow. Wir übersetzen πάθος Leidenschaft, Gefühlswallung. Aber πάθος hängt zusammen mit πάσχειν, leiden, erdulden, ertragen, austragen, sich tragen lassen von, sich be-stimmen lassen durch. Es ist gewagt, wie immer in solchen Fällen, wenn wir πάθος durch Stimmung übersetzen, womit wir die Gestimmtheit und Bestimmtheit meinen. Doch wir müssen diese Übersetzung wagen, weil sie allein uns davor bewahrt, πάθος in einem neuzeitlich-modernen Sinne psychologisch vorzustellen. Nur wenn wir πάθος als Stimmung (disposition) verstehen, können wir auch das θαυμάζειν, das Erstaunen näher kennzeichnen. Im Erstaunen halten wir an uns (être en arrêt). Wir treten gleichsam zurück vor dem Seienden - davor, daß es ist und so und nicht anders ist. Auch erschöpft sich das Erstaunen nicht in diesem Zurücktreten vor dem Sein des Seienden, sondern es ist, als dieses Zurücktreten und Ansichhalten, zugleich hingerissen zu dem und gleichsam gefesselt durch das, wovor es zurücktritt. So ist das Erstaunen die Dis-position, in der und für die das Sein des Seienden sich öffnet. Das Ersta un en ist die Stimmung, innerhalb derer den griechischen Philosophen das Entsprechen zum Sein des Seienden gewährt war”. 35 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.11 1371a31-33 and 1 I.11 370b15 respectively. 36 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A.2 982b 17-21.

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IMITATION AND LEARNING cause, about which new knowledge is constantly looked for: αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν (ἡδοναί) μᾶλλον ποιήσουσι θεωρεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν37. In this way, μανθάνειν becomes a constant act: καὶ ἕκαστος περὶ ταῦτα καὶ τούτοις ἐνεργεῖ ἃ καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀγαπᾷ, οἷον ὁ μὲν μουσικὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ περὶ τὰ μέλη, ὁ δὲ φιλομαθὴς τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ θεωρήματα38. Finally, the constant act of μανθάνειν is accompanied by its own type of pleasure, its οἰκεία ἡδονή. 4. THE PLEASURE OF LEARNING POETICS

IN THE

The sensory arousal of passions caused by dramatic poetry is obvious. As we have seen, though, Aristotle insists on the cognitive nature of the delight that the mimetic product offers, which is an idea that cannot but seem alien to our modern minds39. In the Poetics the principle τὸ δε θαυμαστὸν ήδύ40 becomes accepted as well. In the 4th chapter the concept of admiration is latent and its function is presumed. The admiration must be connected, at least partly, with the identifying action of μανθάνειν. This on its own does not constitute knowledge; it is just the correspondence of the imitated with its original, the solution of a riddle. The admiration in this case results from the accuracy with which the mimetic product is constructed and from the contemplation of the art that created it: θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τήν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν41. It is almost certain that the above learning process through admiring recognition is almost automatic, yet this enhances

37

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VII.12 1153a22-23. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, X.4 1175a12-15. 39 Cf. the valid comment of Sifakis (1986), p. 212: “That art is instructive by being pleasurable is also a proposition that would presumably raise no objection. But that art is pleasurable because it is instructive is a proposition that few people would find easy to accept”. 40 Aristotle, Poetics, I.24 1460a17. 41 Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I.5 645a12-13. 38

25

VASSILIOS BETSAKOS the delight produced, exactly because it is an easy learning: τὸ γὰρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἡδὺ φύσει πᾶσιν ἐστί42. Thus, poetry takes advantage firstly of the capacity, innate to all human beings, to take delight in easy learning. Of course, it does not settle for this alone. We saw that admiration is the first step of the cognitive process, but also that this certainly moves further: it becomes a constant action accompanied by its familiar pleasure. In the same way, in the Poetics, the recognition and the automatic pleasure of μανθάνειν are accompanied by συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον. The cognitive process, in other words, is completed with the full knowledge, which is the discovery of the causes. This also offers the special pleasure which is primarily referred to in the Poetics, the ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονήν, the one created by the σύστασιν τῶν πραγμάτων and relates to the πιθανόν and the δυνατόν κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, exactly because it investigates and reveals to necessarily active spectators the causative connections between deeds and facts. We have already stressed that cognitive pleasure is grounded on human nature. For Aristotle (and for the whole of ancient Greek philosophy) φύσις is not static, it is a movement and a constant ἐνέργεια and verification. The constant action of μανθάνειν is exactly this verification of human nature. With the mediation of pleasure, which functions as the final cause of this action and which supports and broadens the learning process, the spectators of the tragedy reconfirm their sentient quality as beings that live and learn. The above view results from what the Rhetoric says about ἡδονή in its 11th chapter. There Aristotle defines ἡδονή as κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν... ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα... . Learning is also said to cause pleasure for the same reason; ἑν δέ τῷ μανθάνειν <τό> εἰς κατὰ φύσιν καθίσταται43.

42 43

Aristotle, Rhetoric, III.10 1410b10. Aristotle, Rhetoric, I.11 1369b33.

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IMITATION AND LEARNING Therefore, poetry is pleasing because, by offering humans the scope to learn, it gives them the ability to verify their human quality through self-activity. An active life means sensing and learning: δῆλον δὲ λαβοῦσι τί τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ ὡς τέλος. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ γνωρίζειν. Life is indissolubly connected with learning: ὥστε διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ζῆν ἀεὶ βούλεται, ὅτι βούλεται ἀεὶ γνωρίζειν44. If the Poetics is, at least to a certain extent, Aristotle’s answer to the platonic exile of the poets, the function of reconfirmation of the human nature, which the Stagirite reserves for poetry, is his central argument against the moral disdain of ἡδονή by Plato. For Aristotle, the ἡδονή which imitation offers is considered worthy at a pre-moral level, it becomes the sincere and harmless joy of learning, the final cause to the activation of essential human functions.

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Belfiore, Elizabeth (1985): “Pleasure, Tragedy and Aristotelian psychology”, Classical Quarterly 35 (02): pp. 349-361. Croally, Neil T. (1994): Euripidean polemic: The Trojan women and the function of tragedy, London: Cambridge University Press. Else, Gerald F. (1957): Aristotle's Poetics. The argument, London: Oxford University Press. Feyerabend, Paul. (1978): “In defence of Aristotle: Comments on the Condition of Content Increase”. In G. Radnitzky, G. Andersson (eds.): Progress and Rationality in Science, Dodrecht, Boston, London: Boston Studies in the philosophy of science, Vol. LVIII. Halliwell, Francis Stephen (1992): “Pleasure, Understanding, and Emotion in Aristotle's Poetics”, A. 44

Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1244b 23-24 και 1245a 9 respectively.

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